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THE FEDERAL-STATE PARTNERSHIP OF
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Richard W. Fanning, Jr.*
Federal and state governments jointly administer the un-
employment compensation system. Many participants at the
Symposium addressed this aspect of unemployment compen-
sation, and it is the topic of the four Articles that follow. This
Introduction discusses three broad areas in order to provide a
framework for issues concerning federal-state relations in
unemployment compensation. This Introduction also will high-
light some of the points made by Symposium participants in
response to the ideas expressed in the following Articles. Part
I addresses how the federal-state partnership operates and
defines areas of responsibility for both the states and the
federal government. Part I also discusses the balance of power
between the federal and state governments. Part II examines
how the states interact in claims involving more than one
state. Part III questions the traditional role of the federal
government as a partner with the states in the administration
of unemployment compensation.
I. THE FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP
The federal government and the states share responsibility
for the nation's unemployment compensation (UC) system. In
general, the federal government is responsible for establishing
a framework for the system, and each state is given the re-
sponsibility of actually running the system within its juris-
diction.' The UC system is built around a tax credit program
whereby employers pay both a federal and a state payroll tax.2
Employers are then able to credit up to ninety percent of the
* Contributing Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform,
Volume 29, 1996. B.A. 1993, University of Michigan; J.D. 1996, University of Michi-
gan Law School.
1. SAUL J. BLAUSTEIN, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: THE
FIRST HALF CENTURY 265 (1993).
2. MURRAY RUBIN, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
3 (1983).
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state tax against the federal tax.3 This credit, however, is
available only if the state's unemployment insurance program
meets federal requirements,4 and the Secretary of Labor must
certify a state's program on a yearly basis in order for the tax
credit to become available to that state's employers.5 Further,
states must immediately pay amounts received from state
taxes for unemployment compensation to the United States
Treasury Department. These funds are then credited to the
Unemployment Trust Fund,6 and states may withdraw money
from this fund to make UC payments.7
There are three main reasons for the federal-state structure
of the UC system. First, when creating the federal UC laws,
the Roosevelt administration feared that the United States
Supreme Court would hold unconstitutional a completely
federal system, or a system which placed absolute require-
ments upon the states.' Although valid at the time, this
concern no longer operates as a justification for the system
because of changes in constitutional law. The second reason
stemmed from concern that states might be discouraged from
maintaining effective UC programs because of fears that
business would move to other states in order to avoid paying
the taxes needed to provide unemployment benefits.9 This
"race to the bottom" problem remains a concern today,
although scholars acknowledge that a wide variety of other
considerations affect a state's decisions regarding unemploy-
ment compensation.' ° Third, the federal-state partnership
gives the states the flexibility to experiment with unemploy-
ment compensation within a broad federally controlled
structure." Such regulated flexibility limits the cost of
mistakes in two ways. First, it limits the extent of possible
reforms to those allowed under federal law. Second, it limits
any adverse effects of a particular reform on the state that has
3. Id. at 15.
4. Id. at 3.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994).
6. Joseph E. Hight, Unemployment Insurance: Changes in the Federal-State
Balance, 59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 615, 621 (1982).
7. RUBIN, supra note 2, at 38.
8. Hight, supra note 6, at 615.
9. RUBiN, supra note 2, at 14-15; see also Hight, supra note 6, at 615 (explain-
ing the states' concern that employers would be at an economic disadvantage).
10. See BLAUSTEIN, supra note 1, at 266-73.
11. Id. at 325; Hight, supra note 6, at 616.
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adopted a reform. 2 If the reform proves beneficial, other states
may adopt it with reliable information about its costs and
benefits. This third reason for the federal-state structure
remains a valid justification for the UC system. Indeed, most
of the innovation in unemployment compensation comes from
the states.'
3
The UC system places strong incentives upon the states to
comply with federal mandates. Failure to comply weakens a
state's ability to provide UC, increases tax costs for the state's
employers, and places political pressure upon the state's
leaders. 14 Furthermore, federal grants pay for the costs of
administering a state's system only if the state's administra-
tive system meets federal requirements. 5 The state's need for
these grants essentially allows the federal government to
control state administrative practices.16 Thus, while the states
may legally choose not to comply, there are strong financial
and political incentives to follow the federal procedures.
The federal government has been gaining power over the
states in unemployment compensation since the 1970s. Prior
to that time, a balance had existed between the two levels of
government because the practical limitations of enforcing
federal policies in the states kept a check on the federal
government's financial and political power.' 7 This balance has
been upset, however, by the inclusion of the Unemployment
Trust Fund in the federal budget, because federal mandates
that reduce UC coverage will reduce the federal deficit. 8
Consequently, the federal government now has greater incen-
tive to intervene in state programs and the resulting increase
in federal intervention tilts the balance of power in favor of
the federal government. 9
12. RUBIN, supra note 2, at 5, 13, 251.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Id. at 2-3, 18.
15. Id. at 3; see also Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 235-36 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
16. RUBIN, supra note 2, at 27.
17. Id. at 4-5. The federal government did have some financial control over the
states. One of the Symposium presenters, Gerard Hildebrand, described the federal
government's power to withdraw employer tax credits and to refuse to provide
administrative funding to the states-as two "bombs." Gerard Hildebrand, Remarks
at Unemployment Compensation: Continuity and Change Symposium Presented by
the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation and the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform 486 (Mar. 31, 1995) [hereinafter Symposium Transcript]
(transcript on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
18. Hight, supra note 6, at 621.
19. BLAUSTEIN, supra note 1, at 241; RUBIN, supra note 2, at 239-41; Hight,
supra note 6, at 628.
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The federal government exercises its power over the states
in two broad areas. First, it requires that state UC procedures
comply with the administrative requirements of the Social
Security Act.2 ° Second, it brings state laws into conformity
with federally mandated statutory language. 21 The first area
is largely a matter of administrative practice, while the second
is based on statutory language and interpretation.22 Issues of
administrative compliance center around the requirement that
a state's system must contain "methods of administration...
as are found by the Secretary of Labor to be reasonably calcu-
lated to insure full payment of unemployment compensation
when due."23 This requirement has been used to challenge
state laws that delay payment of benefits while an employer
appeals an award of compensation,24 fail to properly calculate
an employee's base period,25 or deny payment to those current-
ly in prison.26 The key issue in these challenges was whether
the state had erected administrative procedures that frustrat-
ed the requirement of full payment of benefits "when due."27
Conformity issues arise when the language and interpreta-
tion of a state's unemployment laws do not meet federal
specifications. An example of a conformity dispute is the
litigation which arose from the requirement that states
provide coverage for elementary and secondary school em-
ployees.28 Several states found that this requirement did not
apply to work performed for schools closely connected with
churches. 29 The Secretary of Labor, however, interpreted the
new language to include these employees.3" In two separate
federal cases, courts upheld the states' view.3' Further, while
20. Gerard Hildebrand, Federal Law Requirements for the Federal-State Unem-
ployment System: Interpretation and Application, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 527, 531-32
(1996).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 532.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (1994).
24. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 122 (1971).
25. Pennington v. Didrickson, 22 F.3d 1376, 1377 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 613 (1994).
26. Jenkins v. Bowling, 691 F.2d 1225, 1227, 1234 (7th Cir. 1982).
27. Java, 402 U.S. at 133; Pennington, 22 F.3d at 1388; Jenkins, 691 F.2d at 1229.
28. See St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 US. 772,
776-78 (1981) (explaining the history of, and amendments to, § 3309 of the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act).
29. Id. at 780 n.10.
30. Id. at 778.
31. Id. at 778-85 (agreeing with South Dakota); Alabama v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 366
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981) (agreeing with Alabama and Nevada);
see also Hildebrand, supra note 20, at 561-62 (providing an additional example).
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the federal government does have substantial control over
state UC systems, it will normally negotiate with a state to
achieve compliance and conformity rather than engage in a
formal legal challenge.
32
The current federal-state UC system does not guarantee
uniformity among the states. Critics cite the lack of uniformity
as a principal argument for a system entirely under federal
control.33 The Article by Maribeth Wilt-Seibert provides an
example of this lack of uniformity. She discusses how federal
requirements concerning teachers and other employees of
educational institutions have created a wide variety of results
in various states.34 From the beginning of the UC program,
however, its creators understood this potential for contrasting
outcomes to be a part of the system.35 Indeed, uniformity is
likely impossible because the needs of individual states vary,36
and flexibility among the states necessarily leads to a lack of
uniformity.3v This situation reflects the value that the system
places upon the ability of states to adjust their UC systems to
meet their individual needs.3" In arriving at the appropriate
balance of power between the federal government and the
states, critics must consider the extent to which the UC sys-
tem should tolerate this lack of uniformity.
II. INTERSTATE RELATIONS
State unemployment compensation systems interact with
each other when a worker files a claim in one state based, in
part or in whole, upon work done in other states.39 Until 1970,
these types of claims were handled in accordance with volun-
tary agreements between states.40 This system produced
inequitable results, however, because individual states could
32. RUBIN, supra note 2, at 3; see also Hildebrand, supra note 20, at 532-34 (pro-
viding a detailed discussion of this process).
33. RUBIN, supra note 2, at 245-46.
34. Maribeth Wilt-Seibert, Unemployment Compensation for Employees ofEduca-
tional Institutions: How State Courts Have Created Variations on Federally Mandated
Statutory Language, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 585 (1996).
35. RUBIN, supra note 2, at 13.
36. BLAUSTEIN, supra note 1, at 326.
37. RUBIN, supra note 2, at 245-46.
38. Hight, supra note 6, at 616.
39. Mark D. Esterle, Interstate Claims: Their History and Their Challenges, 29
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 485, 485 (1996).
40. Id.
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refuse to recognize interstate claims or penalize claims based
on work done in another state.4' In 1970, Congress amended
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act to require that states
handle these claims according to federally approved agree-
ments.42 This amendment provides that states must not deny
or reduce compensation solely because a claim is filed in
another state or because the claimant lives in another state.43
States are also required to "participate in any arrangements
for the payment of compensation on the basis of combining an
individual's wages and employment covered under the State
law with his wages and employment covered under the unem-
ployment compensation law of other States which are ap-
proved by the Secretary of Labor. 44 The workings of this
federally mandated system of interstate agreements is the
subject of the Symposium Article by Mark D. Esterle.4 5
Interstate benefits claims give rise to choice-of-law problems,
specifically concerning eligibility and the length of the base
period. While Esterle's Article points out the need for clarifica-
tion in the choice-of-law rules governing these claims, some
general rules are discernible. It is fairly clear that the base
period of the paying state controls.4" The situation is less
clear, however, with regard to eligibility questions. It appears
that if there is a disparity between the base periods of the
paying and transferring states then the eligibility laws of the
paying state control. 47 If the base periods are the same, howev-
er, then eligibility is to be determined by proceedings in the
transferring state under that state's law.4" These choice-of-law
rules are discussed in greater detail in Esterle's Article, and
they clearly form a major issue in interstate coverage cases.
41. Id. at 5-7.
42. Id.; Employment Security Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-373, 84 Stat.
695 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3307 (1994)).
43. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(9)(A) (1994).
44. Id. § 3304(a)(9)(B).
45. Esterle, supra note 39.
46. See, e.g., In re Claim of Johnson, 605 N.Y.S.2d 449, 450 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)
(interpreting 20 C.F.R. § 616.6). The state in which the claim is filed is referred to
as the "paying state." States from which the claimant seeks to have work time
transferred is called the "transfer state." Esterle, supra note 39, at 8-9. See also
Benjamin Rose Inst. v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 338 A.2d 104, 107
n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976) (applying these definitions to
a claimant who had worked in Ohio, the transferring state, and had filed his claim
in the District of Columbia, the paying state).
47. Benjamin Rose Inst., 338 A.2d at 107.
48. Id.
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Interstate benefits claims also raise due process issues that
were discussed during the Symposium. Due process concerns
arise when a claimant files an interstate claim and then is
faced with administrative procedures in at least two states.
Such a situation increases the potential for a violation of the
claimant's due process rights. Problems may arise when states
fail to properly communicate. This failure may occur when one
state asks another for clarification and that state fails to
respond adequately 49 or when results of proceedings conducted
by one state and transferred to another are defective.5 ° Due
process problems also may occur where filing deadlines depend
upon the forwarding of information from other states.51 Inter-
state benefits claims may involve telephone hearings because,
by definition, the parties are in different states; such hearings
also raise due process concerns.52 Finally, problems may arise
from interstate differences in the right to counsel53 and the
right to appeal a denial of benefits. The potential for these
conflicts clearly needs to be addressed to ensure that the
interstate system protects claimants' due process rights.
III. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Traditionally, the federal government has acted as a partner
of the states in administering unemployment compensation. In
49. See, e.g., Benjamin Rose Inst. v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd.,
355 A.2d 569, 571 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976) (finding that the
transferring state's statement of its law in response to questions from the paying
state was adequate but lacking in clarity).
50. See, e.g., Simmons v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 292 A.2d
797, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (denying an employer's appeal from a grant of benefits
because another state's administrative law judge failed to make findings of fact
concerning the credibility of witnesses which were necessary for the employer to
carry its burden of proof).
51. See, e.g., Dowd v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 459 N.E.2d 471,
473 (Mass. 1984) (remanding for a determination of credibility where a claimant
asserted that he filed late because he was told to wait for his records to arrive from
another state).
52. See Allan A. Toubman et al., Due Process Implications of Telephone Hearings:
The Case for an Individualized Approach to Scheduling Telephone Hearings, 29 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 407 (1996).
53. At least one state supreme court has found that an unemployment benefits
claimant must be informed both of the right to counsel and the ability to secure free
legal aid. Simmons v. Traughber, 791 S.W.2d 21, 23-24 (Tenn. 1990).
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light of this partnership, the Department of Labor prefers
working with the states to resolve conformity and compliance
issues rather than instituting formal proceedings,54 in part
because decertification and withdrawal of administrative fund-
ing would have a severe impact on a state's ability to provide
unemployment compensation.55 This cooperative approach is
also historically based. When the federal government first
developed the UC system, the states lacked sufficient knowl-
edge to set up their own programs.56 To gain this knowledge,
states came to rely upon the federal government.57 Although
this reliance has decreased over time, state-federal cooperation
was established early in the history of the American UC
system and continues today. While there has been tension
between the federal government and the states," the federal
government in many ways remains a partner with the states
in providing unemployment compensation. Furthermore, a
variety of political factors limits the ability of the Department
of Labor to directly challenge the states.59
The Article written by John Gray and Jane Greengold
Stevens sharply criticizes the performance of the federal gov-
ernment as a partner with the states.6 ° In their Article, they
assert that the federal government should take a more active
role in enforcing federal standards, especially timeliness
requirements.61 The difficulty claimants have in forcing the
federal government to pressure states to comply with federal
requirements supports their argument. There might be a
standing issue, because a UC claimant is only indirectly
affected by a suit against the Department of Labor.62 In
addition, the Department of Labor's enforcement of federal
54. RUBIN, supra note 2, at 4.
55. Id. at 3-4.
56. Id. at 23.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2-4.
59. Id. at 29-33.
60. John C. Gray, Jr. & Jane Greengold Stevens, The Law and Politics of the
Enforcement ofFederal Standards for the Administration of Unemployment Insurance
Hearings, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 509 (1996).
61. Id. at 509-12. The federal government requires that decisions from appeals
of initial determinations be issued within a certain time frame. Currently, decisions
must be issued within 30 days of the date of the appeal in 60% of the cases and
within 45 days in 80% of the cases. 20 C.F.R. § 650.4(b) (1995).
62. See, e.g., Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that an
unemployment benefits claimant lacked standing in a suit to force the Department
of Labor to change a federal interpretation that had become effective as state law in
the claimant's state).
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standards may be entitled to judicial deference under the
Administrative Procedure Act.6 3 Plaintiffs who sue state agen-
cies to force compliance with federal standards face fewer
obstacles than plaintiffs who sue the federal government,64 but
suits would have to be brought in each state and would likely
be extremely time consuming. While Gray and Stevens note
that it is possible to join the federal government in suits
against the states, they explain that this approach contains
several serious risks.
65
Gray and Stevens are claimants' advocates from New York
City,6 6 and they write from that perspective. At least one of
the Symposium participants felt that this particular perspec-
tive leads to a lack of balance in their Article. 67 An associate
counsel of the State of New York Department of Labor at-
tended the Symposium and defended the Department's
record. 68 He argued that New York provides more protection
of claimants' interests than other states and that in 1990 the
Department's unemployment insurance agency had tried to
review the quality of the system.69
63. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-702 (1988). Cf. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (discussing the application of the Administrative Procedure Act to
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in a Title VI case and holding that
Title VI leaves room for judicial review).
64. See Cabais, 690 F.2d at 240 (explaining that a recipient of benefits can chal-
lenge state law).
65. Gray & Stevens, supra note 60, at 520-24.
66. Id. at 509 nn.* & **.
67. Audience Member, Symposium Transcript, supra note 17, at 520-21.
68. Id. at 545-47.
69. Id. at 546. Following the Symposium, this audience member provided the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform with a chart illustrating the New York
State Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's progress toward meeting federal
timeliness standards during the period of January 1993 through May 1995. Letter
from Jerome M. Solomon, Associate Counsel, State of New York Department of Labor,
to Alison M. Sawka, Symposium Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform (July 12, 1995) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform). The United States Department of Labor timeliness standards for first level
benefit appeals require that a state issue at least 60% of the decisions within 30 days
of the date of appeal and at least 80% of the decisions within 45 days of appeal. 20
C.F.R. § 650.4(b) (1995). The chart in the letter shows that, in the covered areas, the
standard of 60% of decisions mailed within 30 days was met for two months in 1993,
for six months in 1994, and for four of the first five months in 1995. Letter from
Jerome M. Soloman to Alison M. Sawka, supra. The standard of 80% of decisions
mailed within 45 days was met for two months in 1993, for three months in 1994, and
for three of the first five months in 1995. Id. Furthermore, during the period covered
by the chart, the average percentage of cases in each year that were timely decided
under the federal standards increased. Id. According to Solomon, the Unemployment
Insurance Appeal Board's increasing success in meeting these standards can be
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Gray and Stevens may be correct that the current federal-
state partnership allows the states to avoid federal timeliness
standards at the expense of claimants. Perhaps the federal
government should be less willing to negotiate with the states
on matters that have such a direct impact on so many
claimants. Their claim that the Department of Labor's ability
to decertify and withdraw administrative grants should be con-
sidered to contain lesser measures, including informal
pressure, suggests a way in which the federal government
could deal with the states on these issues.7v However, rigid
enforcement of federal standards on a broad level may deny
the states the flexibility to experiment and adjust to local
conditions. Such a shift of the federal role from a partner with
the states to an advocate for claimants would alter the cur-
rent system of unemployment compensation in this country.
CONCLUSION
The unemployment compensation system has been, and
continues to be, a partnership between the federal govern-
ment and state governments. It is based upon a system of tax
credits to employers and administrative grants to the states.
This system gives the states flexibility to experiment and
adapt their policies to local conditions while allowing the
federal government to establish broad guidelines which en-
sure that adequate coverage will be provided. The federal
government also sets the terms of an interstate agreement by
which the states interact to allow claimants to collect benefits
based upon employment in multiple states. Questions remain,
however, regarding the basic structure of this federal-state
relationship. How these issues are resolved will fundamental-
ly shape the unemployment compensation system.
attributed to the work of an internal task force that made recommendations and
continues to oversee improvements in managing workflow and upgrades in com-
puterization. Id.
70. Gray & Stevens, supra note 60, at 515.
